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“Qui facit per alium facit per se.” (He who acts through another, acts himself.)1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This article sets forth a fully developed legislative history behind Section 
20(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, a detailed summary of cases 
involving Section 20(b) claims, and analyzes the viewpoints of multiple 
commentators to find answers to the following questions: 
• What does the legislative history reveal about the intent of the drafters of 
Section 20(b)? 
• Why should the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Coffey be 
overruled entirely?2 
• Are Section 20(b) claims viable in light of the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders?3 
• What elements are necessary to prove Section 20(b) claims? 
• What kinds of Section 20(b) claims can we expect to see from the 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC)? 
Section 20(b), which has been rarely used by FINRA or the SEC, 
concerns the liability of controlling persons and unlawful activity that takes place 
through other persons.4 
 
                                                
* LL.M. Candidate in Business and Finance Law at The George Washington University Law 
School.  Any errors or omissions are the Author’s own. 
1 HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, A LAW DICTIONARY CONTAINING DEFINITIONS OF THE TERMS 
AND PHRASES OF AMERICAN AND ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE, ANCIENT AND MODERN 979 (2d 
ed. 1910). 
2 Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974).  
3 Janus Capital Grp., 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011). 
4 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78t(b) (2006). 
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II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
The following consists of a comprehensive timeline of the substantive 
legislative history behind Section 20(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(“’34 Act”); however, duplicative, and patently irrelevant references to the other 
sub-sections in Section 20 have been omitted. 
A. The Legislative History of the “Liability of Controlling Persons” Provision 
Prior to delving into the legislative history, it is worth noting that Section 
20(b) did not have a corresponding provision in the Securities Act of 1933 (“’33 
Act”).  One of the reports from the House of Representatives concerning Section 
15 of the ’33 Act stated that the so-called “dummy provisions” were “calculated 
to place liability upon a person who acted through another, irrespective of 
whether a direct agency relationship existed but dependent upon the actual 
control exercised by the one party over the other.”5  This later became the basis 
for Section 20(a) in the ‘34 Act, which was modeled after Section 15 of the ‘33 
Act, but Section 20(b) was a novel regulation.   
As of January 23, 1934, the draft of the “Stock Exchange Bill” did not yet 
contain a provision to address the liability of controlling persons, but this 
changed shortly thereafter on February 1, 1934, when a handwritten note 
contemplated, simply, “[l]iability of controlling persons” as a potential revision.6  
However, on February 9, 1934, President Franklin D. Roosevelt submitted a 
“Recommendation to Congress for Enactment of the Act” with a draft bill 
containing the following provision: 
LIABILITY OF CONTROLLING PERSONS  
Section 19. (a).  Every person who, by or through stock 
ownership, agency, or otherwise, or who pursuant to or in 
connection with any agreement or understanding with one or 
more other persons by or through stock ownership, agency, or 
otherwise, controls any person liable under any provision of this 
Act or of any rule or regulation made pursuant thereto shall also 
be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such 
controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person 
is liable.7 
                                                
5 H.R. REP. NO. 73-152, at 27 (1933). 
6 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (Pub.  L. No. 291, 73d 
Congress, 48 Stat 881, (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78).  
7 S. 2693, 73d Cong. § 19 (2d Sess. 1934) reprinted in 11 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES 
ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at 37-38 (2001). 
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During this same time leading up to President Roosevelt’s 
recommendations, a different committee member, whose identity is unknown, 
drafted somewhat different language to address controlling persons, as follows: 
LIABILITY OF CONTROLLING PERSONS 
Sec. 22.  Every person who, by or through stock ownership, 
agency, or otherwise, or who pursuant to or in connection with 
any agreement or understanding with one or more other persons 
by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, controls any 
person liable under any provision of this act or of any regulation 
promulgated pursuant thereto or of any rule required by such 
regulation shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the 
same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom 
such controlled person is liable and to any penalties to which such 
controlled person is liable, unless he shall sustain the burden of 
proof that he acted in good faith without knowledge that such 
controlled person was committing or was about to commit such 
violation.8 
Nevertheless, Section 19 was later expanded to include sub-sections, 
including the earliest known version of Section 19(b): 
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person directly or indirectly to do 
any act or thing which it would be unlawful for such person to do 
under the provisions of this Act or any rule or regulation 
thereunder through or by means of any other person who is 
controlled by such person by or through stock ownership, agency, 
or otherwise or through or by means of any other person who is 
controlled by such person and one or store other persons by or 
through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise for the purpose of 
avoiding any provisions of this Act or any rule or regulation made 
thereunder.9 
On February 9, 1934, Senator Duncan Fletcher issued remarks on the 
introduction of S. 2693, as follows: 
Section 19 provides that persons who control others subject to 
the provisions of the act and regulations thereunder shall likewise 
be subject themselves.  Not only does it cover the usual devices, 
                                                
8 See supra, note 7. 
9 See supra, note 8.  
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such as dummy corporations, but provides that when a member 
of the immediate family of a person forbidden to make a given 
transaction in a security effects such a transaction, the person 
forbidden shall have the burden of showing that the transaction 
was not an attempted evasion of the act.10 
In a letter dated February 14, 1934, Richard Whitney, the President of the 
New York Stock Exchange, sent a letter to the Presidents of all listed 
corporations describing the impact of the proposed “Securities Exchange Act” 
bill.11  He commented on Section 20(b) as follows: 
Sec. 19 (page 24) makes every person who controls another, 
through stock ownership, agency or otherwise or through any 
agreement or understanding, liable for the acts of the controlled 
person to the same extent as if such acts were his own. In like 
manner, the acts of any spouse or of a child or parent residing 
with a person may be imputed to such person for the purpose of 
determining liability under the Act. 
Soon thereafter, on February 23, 1934, Mr. Whitney expressed another 
opinion about the provision: 
Section 19 of the bill impose[s] liability upon persons controlling 
any other person liable under the provisions of the bill when such 
control exists through stock ownership, agency or otherwise or by 
any agreement or understanding.  These provisions seem to apply 
more particularly to corporations and officers, directors and 
stockholders of corporations than to exchanges or brokers. There 
is, however, one extraordinary provision which might directly 
affect brokers.  
*** 
In view of the numerous provisions of the bill, to which criminal penalties are 
attached, and the fact that a violation of many of them could occur through 
inadvertence, this provision, which makes a man responsible not only for his 
                                                
10 See supra, note 6. 
11 Letter from Richard Whitney “To the Presidents of All Listed Corporations” (February 14, 
1934) (identifying his concerns about the draft provisions of the ’34 Act, “which would seriously 
affect listed corporations and their officers, directors and principal stockholders”).  
http://sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1930/1934_0214_ExchangeWhitneyT.pdf (last visited 
on March 3, 2014). 
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own acts, but for the acts of independent persons, may operate in a grossly 
unfair manner.12 
[Emphasis added.] 
On February 27, 1934, Lowell R. Burch of the New York Airbrake Co. 
wrote a letter as follows:  
Section 19 contains clauses imputing liability for the acts of so-
called “controlled” persons, including not only those controlled by 
stock ownership or agency, but also a spouse, child, or parent 
residing with the person to whom liability is to be imputed in the 
absence of proof of nonapproval or that the transaction was not 
for the purpose of evading a provision of the act.13  
On February 28, 1934, Sidney Blumenthal of Sidney Blumenthal & Co., 
Inc., wrote a letter stating:  
Sec. 19, page 24: This section seems to be particularly dangerous 
to trustees handling investments assigned to them by persons who 
are at the same time officers or directors and who still have a right 
of joining with the trustee in an advisory capacity, possibly 
influencing their decision.  Thus, the director or officer of a 
company owning securities may have deposited some of the 
securities in behalf of certain beneficiaries under trust agreements, 
and may exercise his knowledge and judgment in behalf of such 
trust beneficiaries quite differently from that with which he would 
view his own interests. It would seem that this section would 
make it inadvisable for any beneficiary of such trust to own any 
securities in the company in which one of the trustees may be 
interested, even though the trustee is fully familiar with, and 
knows all about this business, and knows very little about other 
businesses in which the beneficiary would otherwise have to be 
interested, if such a course were made necessary by the sale of 
                                                
12 Stock Exchange Regulation: Hearings before the H. Interstate and Foreign Commerce Comm. on H.R. 7852 
and H.R. 8720, 73d Cong. 228 (1934) (statement of Mr. Whitney). 
13 Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings before the S. Banking and Currency Comm. on S. Res. 84 (72nd 
Congress) and S. Res. 56 and S. Res. 97 (73rd Congress), 73d Cong. 7022 (1934) (statement of Mr. 
Lowell Burch). 
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securities in the company of which the co-trustee is an officer, and 
the reinvestment of funds in other companies.14 
On February 28, 1934, Thomas G. Corcoran, an attorney and one of the 
co-drafters of the ’34 Act, observed that the purpose of Section 19 is “to prevent 
evasion of the provisions of the section by organizing dummies who will 
undertake the actual things forbidden by the section.”15  According to Mr. 
Corcoran, if a bank or a brokerage controlled a separate corporation that bought 
and dealt in securities, then the bank or brokerage would be responsible for the 
acts of the separate corporation.16  However, a controlling originating entity that 
set up a separate corporation and ceded control would not be subject to any 
liability under the act.17 
On March 6, 1934, Frank R. Hope, President of the Association of Stock 
Exchange Firms, New York City, contended: 
Section 19 is entitled “Liability of Controlled Persons” and 
contains drastic provisions making every person who controls 
another through stock ownership, agency or otherwise liable for 
the acts of the controlled person as if such acts were his own.  
What is meant by a controlled person is not described and, 
therefore, the full effect of this section cannot be understood. 
There are many liabilities established for individuals by the bill and 
to what extent an individual is a controlled person within the 
meaning of this section is difficult to understand.18 
On March 8, 1934, a Memorandum (draft), of unknown authorship, 
suggested amendments to Section 19: 
I would suggest that subsections (a) and (b) be redrafted and made 
specifically to cover (1) the controller of a dummy corporation or 
                                                
14 Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings before the S. Banking and Currency Comm. on S. Res. 84 (72d Cong.) 
and S. Res. 56 and S. Res. 97 (73d Cong.), 73d Cong. 7267 (1934) (statement of Mr. Sidney 
Blumenthal, Sidney Blumenthal & Co.). 
15 Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings before the S. Banking and Currency Comm. on S. Res. 84 (72d Cong.) 
and S. Res. 56 and S. Res. 97 (73d Cong.), 73d Cong. 6571 (1934) (statement of Mr. Thomas 
Corcoran, co-drafter of the Act). 
16 Id. at 6572. 
17 Id. 
18 Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings before the S. Banking and Currency Comm. on S. Res. 84 (72d Cong.) 
and S. Res. 56 and S. Res. 97 (73d Cong.), 73d Cong. 6915 (1934) (statement of Mr. Frank Hope, 
President of Association of Stock Exchange Firms). 
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individual; (2) a principal who actually authorizes the transaction 
in question; (3) authorization given under circumstances not 
amounting to Agency.  The difficulty with the present language is 
that it may include liability for unauthorized acts of an agent who 
has been chosen with reasonable care.  On a literal construction, if 
the agent cannot sustain the burden of showing due care, the 
principal is automatically liable, regardless of his own good faith 
and due care.19 
On April 3, 1934, a proposal to amend Section 19(b) was offered as 
follows: 
(b)  Amend to read: “It shall be unlawful for any person, for the 
purpose of avoiding any provision of this Act or any rule or 
regulation thereunder to do, directly or indirectly, through or by 
means of any other person who is controlled by or through stock 
ownership, agency, or otherwise by such person or by such 
persons and one or more other persons, or who is under such 
direct or indirect common control with such person, any act or 
thing which it would be unlawful for such person to do under the 
provisions of this Act or any rule or regulation thereunder.”20 
[Emphasis appears in the original.] 
On April 30, 1934, Representative Sam Rayburn, from the Committee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, presented a report on the Securities Exchange 
Bill with a recommendation that it be passed.21  In the version presented by the 
House, Section 19 concerned “Liabilities of Controlling Persons” and subsection 
(b) made it “unlawful for any person to do, through any other person, anything 
that he is forbidden to do himself.”22  Representative Rayburn’s report stated as 
follows: 
                                                
19 Memorandum (draft) Suggested Amendments to the “present” Bill, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (Pub. L. No. 291, 73d Cong., 48 Stat 881, (1934), 15 
U.S.C. § 78). 
20 Memorandum Re Amendments to Draft of April 3, 1934 – (First Committee Print), 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (Pub. L. No. 291, 73d 
Congress, 48 Stat 881, (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78).  
21 H.R. Rep. No. 73-1383, at 26 (1934) reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES 
ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at 26 (2001). 
22 Id. 
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In this section and in Section 11, when reference is made to 
“control”, the term is intended to include actual control as well as 
what has been called legally enforceable control (See Handy & 
Harmon v. Burnet, 284 U.S. 135 (1931).  It was thought undesirable 
to attempt to define the term.  It would be difficult if not 
impossible to enumerate or to anticipate the many ways in which 
actual control may be exerted.  A few examples of the methods 
used are stock ownership, lease, contract, and agency.  It is well 
known that actual control sometimes may be exerted through 
ownership of much less than a majority of the stock of a 
corporation either by the ownership of such stock alone or 
through such ownership in combination with other factors.23 
On May 4, 1934, an amendment was offered by Representative Hollister 
to strike Section 19(a), which makes it an unlawful act if it is performed by a 
controlling person.24  He proposed using the term agent instead of controlling 
person because he believed the phrase “controlling person” was nonsensical and 
had no legal precedent.25  His other concern was that Section 19(b) would open 
the possibility of strike suits, “…to attack an honest man under this bill merely 
because he may have wealth, or because he might have some connection with a 
corporation which has made a report of some kind or another.”  In spite of his 
comments, the proposed amendment was rejected, and as Representative Lea 
explained, “the object of this provision is to catch the man who stands 
behind the scenes and controls the man who is in a nominal position of 
authority.”26  Representative Lea also clarified that relying on an agency theory 
will not accomplish the same thing – the rationale being that the dummy ought to 
be responsible because he is the real party in interest.27   
On May 11, 1934, a letter signed by a committee affiliated with the 
National Association of Manufacturers was read into the record: “This section 
should be substantially modified.  Liability of a controlling person should be 
limited to cases where the controlling person makes use of other persons in order 
to evade the act.”28  However, the Senate did not discuss the proposed 
                                                
23 Id. 
24 78 CONG. REC. 8086, 8094 (1934) (statement of Rep. Hollister). 
25 Id. 
26 78 CONG. REC. 8086,8095 (1934) (statement of Rep. Lea). 
27 Id. 
28 78 CONG. REC. 8563,8581 (1934). 
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amendment and on June 6, 1934, the bill went into law and the language of 
Section 20(b), later codified as 15 U.S.C. § 78t(b), has remained the same since 
that time:  
§ 78t. Liability of controlling persons and persons who aid 
and abet violations 
*** 
(b) Unlawful activity through or by means of any other person 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to do any 
act or thing which it would be unlawful for such person to do 
under the provisions of this title or any rule or regulation 
thereunder through or by means of any other person. 
On May 12, 1934, Section 19 was renumbered and became Section 20 of the ’34 
Act.29 
III. ANALYSIS OF PERTINENT CASE LAW 
A. Prior Relevant Case Law Before the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 
1.  Handy & Harmon v. Burnet 
In Handy & Harman, the Court examined whether the six majority 
shareholders who held 75% of the stock in the Handy & Harman Corporation 
“controlled” the 20% of stock owned by Hamilton & De Loss, Inc., a separate 
corporation.30  The specific tax issue was whether the two corporations were 
affiliated within Section 240(a) of the Revenue Act of 1918.31  This arose because 
Hamilton, the president of Hamilton & De Loss, Inc., had pledged his shares to 
one of the majority stockholders as collateral for a loan.32 Also, the Court noted 
Mr. Hamilton had never opposed any of the majority shareholders.33 
Consequently, based on these facts, the Court concluded that Hamilton did not 
have legally enforceable control and the majority shareholders were the ones who 
exerted actual control.34  
                                                
29 78 CONG. REC. 8666,8708 (1934). 
30 Handy & Harmon v. Burnet, 284 U.S. 136, 138-39 (1931).   
31 Id. at 138.   
32 Id. at 139. 
33 Id.  
34 Id. at 140.   
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This case was an interesting choice for the drafters of the ’34 Act to rely 
upon to distinguish between actual and legally enforceable control.  Although this 
distinction has been used sparingly since that time, out of nine reported decisions, 
nearly all of which concern Section 20(a) claims, only one case involving a Section 
20(b) claim mentions the concept of legally enforceable control.35  In spite of this 
scant treatment, one commentator opined that in applying the logic behind the 
Court’s decision with Section 20(b), “this indicates an intent to require some 
degree of realistic control, as would be provided by legal or actual control.”36 
B. Subsequent Private Actions Involving Section 20(b) After 1934 
There are four major cases evaluating Section 20(b) claims in varying 
degrees of depth that have been decided since 1967 and a summary of these 
decisions is set forth in chronological order.  One of the issues arising in 
evaluating Section 20(b) claims is that it is frequently tacked on to discussions 
concerning Section 20(a).  However, there are differences between the two sub-
sections and the distinctions have not been consistently recognized by the courts 
and even commentators who often confuse the two provisions.  Accordingly, 
other cases with minimal relevance and negligible treatment of Section 20(b) were 
consciously omitted. 
1.  Myzel v. Fields 
Lakeside Plastics and Engraving Co. (“LPE”) was organized in 1946 by 
cousins, Zelman and Clarence Levine, as a small plastics corporation to make 
advertising signs.37 Upon its original issue there were 1,140 shares of common 
stock issued to some 17 persons, at a par value of $50 per share.38 In 1948, a sales 
agency, entitled Lakeside Plastics Sales Co. (“LPS”) was organized by Orrin and 
William Levine, brothers of Clarence Levine, who were also original stockholders 
and directors of LPE.39 “From 1953 to sometime in 1957, the stock of LPE 
became totally vested in the hands of the four Levines and [LPS]”.40 “By 1958, 
                                                
35 Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564 (9th Cir. 1990). 
36 William H. Kuehnle, Secondary Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws-Aiding and Abetting 
Conspiracy,  
Controlling Person, and Agency: Common-Law Principles and the Statutory Scheme, 14 J. CORP. L. 313, 357 
(1989). 
37 Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 728 (8th Cir. 1967). 
38 Id.  
39 Id.  
40 Id.  
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640 shares of LPE were owned by LPS.”41 Around  that time, a one-fourth 
interest in LPS was sold to Zelman and Clarence Levine.42 In 1961, LPE re-
acquired 640 shares of its stock as part of a merger with Lakeside Properties, Inc. 
(“LPI”), and it then retired the shares.43 The remaining 500 shares of LPE stock, 
then owned one-quarter each by the Levines, was in turn exchanged for 500,000 
shares of [a newly formed corporation called Lakeside Industries, Inc. (LII)]”.44  
Thereafter, 150,000 additional shares of LII were offered for sale at $9 per 
share.”45   
Although the company struggled from 1946 to 1951, it entered into a 
large contract in 1951.46 Thereafter, in 1953, sales zoomed but the company failed 
to disclose it had made a $30,000 profit.47 The Myzel brothers were friends of the 
Levines.48 Although the company’s sales and prospects were improving, they 
made the following representations to the shareholders: “(1) the stock was not 
worth anything, (2) the company was making no money, and (3) Myzel had sold 
his own stock.”49   
At trial, the court instructed that “the Levines were liable for the acts of 
[the Myzels] ‘if they knew or should have known” that the Myzels were 
‘purchasing’ the stock for the Levines ‘or with the intention of reselling’ to 
them.”50 The appellees argued that “‘a plan’ existed to obtain the stock for the 
Levines, and … that if such existed the Levines would be liable for any fraud that 
the Myzels committed.51 The trial court emphasized that the Levines must ‘know 
and approve’ of the Myzel activities in order to be liable.52 The court added that 
there could be no liability of the Levines ‘if they had not sought to have the 
                                                
41 Id.  
42 Id. at 728-29. 
43 Id. at 729. 
44 Id.  
45 Id.  
46 Id.  
47 Id. at 730. 
48 Id. at 729. 
49 Id. at 730. 
50 Id. at 737. 
51 Id.  
52 Id. at 737-38. 
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Myzels obtain it.’”53 On appeal, the court stated the liability of the Levines is 
governed neither by principles of agency nor conspiracy.54  
The appellants argued “that the instruction omits as a prerequisite to 
liability that under the  ‘plan’ the Levines also must know that the method to be 
used by the Myzels would be unlawful, relying upon common law conspiracy 
cases.”55  The court rejected this argument, stating as follows: 
However, where the evidence shows the ‘controlling person’ is the 
actual intended beneficiary of the stock purchase, ‘control’ under 
the Act does not require knowledge of the specific wrongdoing 
any more than a principal must know in advance of his agent's 
fraud. All that is required is that the controlling person ‘directly or 
indirectly’ induces the purchase.  Under such circumstances, if the 
direct purchaser fails to disclose material information in violation 
of Rule 10b-5, the ‘controlling person’ cannot excuse himself, 
even under the ‘good faith’ clause of Section 20(a).  To hold 
otherwise would vitiate the plain meaning of Section 20(b), that one cannot do 
indirectly through another what he cannot do himself.  Therefore, even 
assuming arguendo, that there was failure to properly instruct 
under a civil or criminal conspiracy theory, the language of Section 
20 obviates any possible prejudicial effect. Furthermore, the court 
not only required the Levines to know of Myzels' activities, but 
required ‘approval’ of them, before they were responsible.  Such 
requirements are neither explicit not implicit in the Act.  We think 
this qualified instruction adequately protected the rights of all 
appellants.56 
While Myzel is mildly instructive in its discussion of controlling persons, it 
subsequently received negative treatment by the Eighth Circuit and other 
jurisdictions, so its relevance to Section 20(b) claims is limited.   
2.  Nelson v. Nat'l Republic Bank of Chicago 
This district court case was filed by investors who alleged that the 
defendants, through a course of willful nondisclosure, caused bonds to be placed 
                                                
53 Id. at 738. 
54 Id.  
55 Id.  
56 Id. at 738-39. (emphasis added). 
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in the interstate market for sale to plaintiff.57  Also, “[p]laintiffs allegedly would 
not have purchased the bonds if various defendants had disclosed information 
that they had a legal obligation to reveal.”58  Plaintiff further alleged “that the 
defendants had an obligation to reveal this information, and that their failure to 
do so ultimately caused damage to plaintiff when the bond issuers went 
bankrupt.”59  One count was directed at the bank, an insurer and multiple 
individual defendants as controlling persons under Sections 15 and 20 of the 1934 
Act.60  This specific allegation was that the bank controlled the activities of an 
individual, the insurer controlled the bank, multiple individuals controlled the 
bank, and the directors of a broker-dealer controlled the activities of the broker-
dealer.61   
In rejecting the bank’s motion to dismiss this particular claim for relief, 
the court emphasized twice that Section 20(b) provides for broad liability and it 
held that the directors of the broker-dealer may be considered controlling persons 
for violations of the Exchange Act.62  As a result, the court denied the motion to 
dismiss and the Section 20(b) claim was allowed to proceed.63    
This case remains good law and it is noteworthy because it has been cited 
positively for the proposition that directors and executive officers normally would 
constitute a controlling group.64 
3.  Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp. 
“Emil Wilkowski, a dishonest securities salesman, embezzled money 
entrusted to him by four clients.”65  Wilkowski also failed to inform the National 
Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”) of a prior forgery conviction in his 
application for registration with the NASD.66  Regardless, Wilkowski was 
                                                
57 Nelson v. Nat'l Republic Bank of Chicago, No. 80 C 6401, 1984 WL 2424, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 
1984). 
58 Id.  
59 Id.  
60 Id. at *7.   
61 Id. 
62 Id. at *8.   
63 Id. 
64 See ARNOLD S. JACOBS, DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS, § 11:4 
(2015). 
65 Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1566 (9th Cir. 1990).   
66 Id.  
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convicted of criminal securities fraud and grand theft.67  Thereafter, the victimized 
investors sought to recover their losses from the brokerage firm, Titan, and a 
financial counseling firm with which Wilkowski was associated.68  One of the 
investors’ claims was that Titan was primarily liable under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act 
and Rule 10b-5 for failing to disclose to investors Wilkowski’s prior forgery 
conviction.69  Additionally, the court considered whether Titan, a broker-dealer, 
was a “controlling person” with respect to its registered representatives within the 
meaning of Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act.70  
The district court determined Titan was not a “controlling person” within 
Section 20(a) for two reasons: (1) “Titan had no “power or influence” over 
Wilkowski because he was an independent contractor and Titan did not exercise 
any control over Wilkowski's defalcation of funds; [Titan] did not benefit from 
the defalcation of funds; and did not authorize Wilkowski to receive personal 
checks”; and, (2) “because Titan and Wilkowski had contractually agreed 
Wilkowski would be an independent contractor, Titan had no duty to supervise 
unauthorized and unknown transactions and therefore could not have been a 
‘culpable participant’ in Wilkowski’s misdeeds.71  However, the Ninth Circuit 
reversed on this issue, accepting the SEC’s arguments, supplied in its amicus 
curiae brief, that a broker-dealer is a controlling person under Section 20(a) with 
respect to its registered representatives.72  The SEC also contended “that the 
representative/broker-dealer relationship is necessarily one of controlled and 
controlling person because the broker-dealer is required to supervise its 
representatives.”73  Moreover, the SEC asserted “the broker-dealer exercises 
control over its registered representatives because the representatives need the 
broker-dealer to gain access to the securities markets.”74  Adopting the SEC’s 
position, the Ninth Circuit rejected Titan’s “argument that broker-dealers can 
avoid a duty to supervise simply by entering into a contract that purports to make 
                                                
67 Id. at 1567.  
68 Id. at 1566.  
69 Id. at 1572.   
70 Id.   
71 Id. at 1572-73.   
72 Id. at 1574.   
73 Id. at 1573.  
74 Id.  
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the representative, who is not himself registered under the Act as a broker-dealer, 
an ‘independent contractor.’”75  
In Section IV of the majority opinion, the investors “also claim[ed] on 
appeal that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Titan on 
[their] claim that Titan was secondarily liable for Wilkowski’s Section 10(b) 
violation under the common law theory of respondeat superior.”76  The Ninth Circuit 
reversed and remanded the matter, permitting the investors to move forward with 
their theories of liability based on both Section 20(a) and respondeat superior.77  The 
court stated that Section 20(a) was intended to “to prevent evasion” of the law 
“by organizing dummies who will undertake the actual things forbidden.”78  The 
court asserted that Section 20(a) “was intended to impose liability on controlling 
persons, such as controlling shareholders and corporate officers, who would not 
be liable under respondeat superior because they were not the actual employers.79  
Thus, [the court reasoned that Congress, by] enacting Section 20(a), … expanded 
upon the common law and … created a defense (the good faith defense) that 
would be available only to those who, under common law principles of 
respondeat superior, would have faced no liability at all.”80  As part of this, the 
court believed that Congress expanded the common law by enacting Section 20(a) 
to permit a comprehensive statutory scheme to protect the public.81  It also 
considered the following possibilities that may flow from controlling persons: 
When both remedies are available, then the agent who personally 
committed the wrong is primarily liable (based on proof of his 
actions or omissions, and on scienter when required); the principal 
who acts through the agent (assuming the agent is acting within 
the scope of his agency) is secondarily liable; and other persons 
who are not subject to respondeat superior but who nevertheless 
control the wrongdoer can be held liable under § 20(a).  Because 
the liability of persons under § 20(a) represents an extension of 
liability, beyond that imposed by the common law, such persons 
                                                
75 Id. at 1574.  
76 Id. at 1576. 
77 Id. at 1578. 
78 Id. at 1577. 
79 Id.  
80 Id.  
81 Id.  
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are afforded statutory defenses not available in the principal-agent 
context. Controlling persons may thus avoid liability under § 20(a) 
by demonstrating that they acted in “good faith” within the 
meaning of that section.82 
Notably, the dissent, written by Circuit Judge Hall, disagreed with the 
majority’s opinion in Section IV.83  Circuit Judge Hall took a different view of the 
legislative history of Section 20(a) and believed that preventing “dummy” 
corporations from escaping liability was only one purpose and that the primary 
purpose was to limit liability to those whose conduct is in some sense culpable.84  
Instead, she argued that Section 20(a) was modeled on Section 15 of the 
Securities Act of 1933, which rejected the notion of “insurer” liability.85  The basis 
for her reasoning was from Christoffel v. E.F. Hutton & Co.,86: 
Legislative history reveals that the Senate and the House had 
advocated different versions of the standard that should govern 
controlling persons.  The House proposed that the standard 
should be a “fiduciary standard,” which would require a duty of 
due care.  (H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933); H.R. 
Rep. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1933).)  On the other hand, 
the Senate proposed an “insurer's liability” (S. Rep. No. 47, 73d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933), the Fletcher Report).  Congress enacted 
the House version, rejecting the insurer concept.87 
Additionally, she characterized the majority’s reading of the legislative 
history as “illogical” because Congress would not have enacted Sections 20(a) and 
(b) to catch “dummy” organizations and give them a good faith defense but deny 
this for ordinary controlling persons such as employers.88  Accordingly, she 
contended that holding an employer liable for securities fraud committed by an 
employee without proof of fault would violate the express language of the Act.89  
                                                
82 Id. at 1577-78. 
83 Id. at 1579. 
84 Id. at 1579-80.   
85 Id. at 1580. 
86 Id. at 1577-78. 
87 Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d at 1580 (citing Christoffel v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 588 F.2d 665, 
668 (9th Cir.1978)). 
88 Id. at 1581. 
89 Id.  
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This is because Section 20(a) extends the good faith defense to employers and 
there is no justification for expanding employer liability under respondeat 
superior.90  Thus, she objected to holding broker-dealers secondarily liable under 
the common law doctrine of respondeat superior because it would render Section 
20(a) superfluous, “for [employers] would be responsible despite their having 
fulfilled a stringent good faith test based on their having maintained and enforced 
reasonable and proper supervision and internal controls.”91   
4.  Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders 
a.  Factual Background 
In this case, “First Derivative Traders (First Derivative) represent[ed] 
shareholders who owned mutual funds.”92  Janus Capital Group (JCG) was the 
parent company and creator of Janus Investment Fund.93  JCG’s subsidiary, Janus 
Capital Management (JCM) was the fund’s administrator and investment adviser.94  
The Janus Investment Fund (JIF) was a separate legal entity owned entirely by 
mutual fund investors and was not included as a party to this lawsuit.95  During 
the relevant period of time, “all of [JIF’s] officers were also officers of JCM [and] 
one member of JCF’s board of trustees was also associated with JCM.”96 
JIF issued a prospectus in February 2002 stating the funds were not 
suitable for market timing, but by September 2003 it came to light that JCG had 
entered into secret arrangements to permit market timing in several of JCM’s 
funds.97  Thereafter, First Derivative filed a complaint for violations of Rule 10b-5 
and §10b of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.98  Justice Breyer 
characterized this as a “typical” Rule 10b-5 “fraud on the market” claim with First 
Derivative alleging JCM made statements creating the misleading impression it 
would implement measures to curb market timing.99  Additionally, First 
                                                
90 Id.  
91 Id. at 1582. . 
92 Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2297 (2011). 
93 Id. at 2297-98. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 2298. 
96 Id. at 2299. 
97 Id. at 2300. 
98 Id.  
99 Id. at 2306. 
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Derivative alleged JCG was liable for JCM’s acts as a “controlling person” under 
Section 20(a).100 
b.  The Majority’s Opinion 
Although the Fourth Circuit determined that First Derivative sufficiently 
alleged that JCG and JCM made the misleading statements because they 
participated in the writing and dissemination of the prospectuses, the Supreme 
Court reversed.101  Writing for the 5-4 majority, Justice Thomas concluded that 
the “maker” of a statement is the “person or entity with ultimate authority over 
the statement, including its content and whether and how to communicate it.”102  
Specifically, this meant that JCM could not be liable because it did not “make” 
any of the statements in the JIF prospectuses.103  This decision was reached in 
spite of the Court acknowledging that First Derivative “persuasively argue that 
investment advisers exercise significant influence over their client funds” because 
JCM and JCF were legally separate entities and corporate formalities were 
observed here.104  Moreover, reapportioning liability is “properly the responsibility 
of Congress and not the courts.”105                 
Concerning the Section 20(a) claim for control person liability, the Court 
agreed that First Derivative’s theory “resembles the liability imposed by Congress 
for control.”106  However, it declined to adopt the theory because it would “[]read 
into Rule 10b–5 a theory of liability similar to—but broader in application than, 
see post, at 2310 — what Congress has already created expressly elsewhere.”107 
Also, even if JCM was significantly involved in drafting the prospectus, it did not 
make any of the statements because JIF had “ultimate control.”108   
 
 
                                                
100 Id. at 2301. 
101 Id. at 2299.  
102 Id. at 2302. 
103 Id. at 2305. 
104 Id. at 2304.   
105 Id.  
106 Id.  
107 Id.  In a footnote, Justice Thomas also commented: “We do not address whether Congress 
created liability for entities that act through innocent intermediaries in 15 U.S.C.A. § 78t(b).”  Id. at 
2304 n. 10. 
108 Id. at 2305. 
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c.  Justice Breyer’s Dissent 
In dissent, Justice Breyer argued that many different individuals and 
company representatives “might ‘make’” statements in a prospectus -- even if the 
board of directors has ultimate content-related responsibility.”109  Also, he framed 
the main issue as whether JCM is primarily liable for violating the Act, not 
whether it simply helped others violate the Act.110  Additionally, he contended 
there is no basis for the majority’s view that its rule is necessary to avoid a “theory 
of liability similar to – but broader in application than” Section 20(a)’s control 
person liability.111  This is because the Court previously held that the possibility of 
an express remedy under the securities laws does not preclude a claim under § 
10(b).112  Thus, in reviewing the facts, Justice Breyer determined that JCM “made” 
the fraudulent statements about market timing in the prospectuses and concluded 
JCM was liable, stating: “as long as some managers, sometimes, can be held to 
have ‘ma[d]e’ a materially false statement, [JCM] can be held to have done so on 
the facts alleged here.”113   
Moreover, Justice Breyer stated his concern that the majority’s rule would 
make it unlikely the SEC could pursue primary violators who “make” false 
statements or pursue aiders and abettors.114  This is because managers would not 
be liable as principals because they did not “make” the statement and there would 
be no other primary violator that might have tried to “aid” or “abet.”115  
Therefore, this is problematic because it may well create a loophole which 
Congress did not intend in enacting the securities laws.116  In this regard, 
addressing the majority’s footnote concerning Section 20(b), Justice Breyer stated, 
as follows: 
If the majority believes, as its footnote hints, that § 20(b) could 
provide a basis for liability in this case, ante, at 2304, n. 10, then it 
should remand the case for possible amendment of the complaint.  
‘There is a dearth of authority construing Section 20(b),’ which 
                                                
109 Id. at 2306.   
110 Id. at 2308. 
111 Id. at 2310. 
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113 Id. at 2312. 
114 Id. at 2310.   
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116 Id. at 2311.   
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has been thought largely ‘superfluous in 10b–5 cases.’  5B A. 
Jacobs, Disclosure and Remedies Under the Securities Law § 11–
8, p. 11–72 (2011).  Hence respondent, who reasonably thought 
that it referred to the proper securities law provision, is faultless 
for failing to mention § 20(b) as well.117 
Remarkably, Justice Breyer also addressed the issue of whether JCM could 
have “ma[d]e” the false statements in the prospectuses at issue and concluded 
affirmatively that it did.118  He opined that the specific relationships alleged 
among JCM, the JIF, and the prospectus statements warrant the conclusion that 
JCM did “make” those statements.119  However, because Justice Breyer reached 
this particular conclusion, he did not evaluate the potential success or failure of a 
Section 20(b) claim.  
C.  Securities and Exchange Commission Actions Involving Section 20(b) After 1934 
1.  Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Coffey120 
“This was an action to enjoin corporate officials personally for alleged 
corporate violations of federal securities laws.”121  In this case, a corporation, 
King Resources, sold two-year corporate notes to a state treasurer.122  The SEC 
asserted that King was a controlling person within section 20(a) of the 1934 Act 
and that it may be inferred from the District Court's holding that he failed to 
establish a ‘good faith’ defense, since the District Court ruled against King.123   
The Sixth Circuit rejected the SEC’s position and held that section 20(a) 
of the 1934 Act may not be relied upon by the SEC in an injunctive enforcement 
action.124  Instead, the court stated that Section 20(b) of the 1934 Act provides for 
the unlawful actions of controlling persons, and the SEC may only seek 
injunctions against unlawful actions.125  Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act makes a 
                                                
117 Id.  
118 Id.  
119 Id.  
120Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974). 
121 Id.  
122 Id. at 1308.  
123 Id. at 1318. 
124 Id.  
125 This part of the Sixth Circuit’s holding concerning injunctive relief as the sole means to address 
unlawful action under Section 20(b) has been challenged as being of “questionable” validity.  See, 
ARNOLD S. JACOBS, DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS § 11:8 (2015). 
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controlling person liable “to any person to whom such controlled person is 
liable.”126  “As a matter of legislative interpretation, [the court held] that the SEC 
is not a person under section 20(a), since section 20(a) was meant to specify the 
liability of controlling persons to private persons suing to vindicate their interests. 
Section 20(b) sets forth the standard of lawfulness to which a controlling person 
must conform, on penalty of liability in injunction to the SEC or criminal 
prosecution.” 127 
“Under section 20(b), [a party must show] knowing use of a controlled 
person by a controlling person before a controlling person comes within its 
ambit.128  Without such a restriction, every link in a chain of command would be 
personally criminally and civilly liable for the violations of inferior corporate 
agents.129  This was not the congressional intent in enacting section 20(b).”130  
Accordingly, the court concluded that King, board chairman of King Resources 
Co, did not aid-abet misrepresentations and omissions concerning King 
Resources made by an intermediary "money finder" in selling King Resources 
securities to the State of Ohio.131  Also, there was no evidence King knew of the 
misrepresentations and omissions, nor that he knowingly assisted or intended to 
aid.132 
Because this case is based on unsupported assumptions regarding the 
legislative history and reaches a number of fatally flawed conclusions, a thorough 
analysis and criticism of its reasoning appears in Section V, below. 
2.  Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Savoy Industries, Inc. 
The SEC alleged that Zimmerman, or a group of which Zimmerman was 
a member, controlled Savoy Industries.133  Under this “control” branch of 
liability, the SEC maintained that Zimmerman was liable vicariously for Savoy 
promulgating or filing documents, including an “allegedly misleading Form 8-K, 
Form 10-K, American Stock Exchange listing application, and letter to 
                                                
126 Id.  
127 Id.   
128 Id.  
129 Id.  
130 Id.   
131 Id.  
132 Id.  
133 Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Savoy Indus., Inc., 587 F.2d 1149, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
308 TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 16 
 
stockholders.”134  In essence, Zimmerman failed to disclose his identity and role 
in a takeover transaction in Savoy’s filings.135 
In its analysis, the D.C. Circuit stated as follows: “The history of the 
interpretation of [S]ection 20 in the courts has hardly been a history of 
consistency, especially in the context of SEC enforcement actions.”136  The court 
acknowledged the Second Circuit has suggested that section 20(a) is available to 
the Commission in enforcement proceedings in Sec. Exch. Comm’n  v. Management 
Dynamics, Inc.,137 where the court stated that “(w)e agree with the Commission that 
with respect to SEC enforcement actions, Section 20(a) was not intended as the 
sole measure of employer liability.”138   
The D.C. Circuit assumed that Section 20(a) was available for the SEC to 
pursue, but the court remanded the matter for further findings.139  The court 
noted it was troubled by the fact that the district court did not recite its statutory 
basis for imposing liability on Zimmerman.140  It also stated there was “no specific 
finding that Zimmerman used Savoy knowingly.”141  Moreover, the court wanted 
to see a finding that Zimmerman used Savoy, but the evidence was speculative 
and did not convince the court to affirm on a Section 20(b) theory.142  In sum, the 
court wanted to see more persuasive evidence that Zimmerman controlled Savoy 
to accomplish the securities violation.143  
On remand, the District Court found that Zimmerman controlled both 
the takeover group and Savoy, through its officers and directors, during the 
period of dissemination of the false and misleading documents at issue in the 
litigation.144  Accordingly, the District Court held Zimmerman responsible under 
Sections 10(b), 13(a), 13(d), 20(a), and 20(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
                                                
134 Id. at 1161.  
135 Id. at 1169. 
136 Id.  
137 Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 812 (2d Cir. 1975).  
138 587 F.2d  at 1170. 
139 Id. at 1171. 
140 Id. at 1169. 
141 Id. at 1170. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Savoy Indus., Inc, 665 F.2d 1310, 1313-14 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
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1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder.145  And on appeal after remand, the district 
court’s findings were upheld.146   
3.  Dirks v. Sec. Exch. Comm’n 
In this matter, the Supreme Court devoted one line of the opinion to 
Section 20(b) claims, as follows: 
Not only are insiders forbidden by their fiduciary relationship 
from personally using undisclosed corporate information to their 
advantage, but they may not give such information to an outsider 
for the same improper purpose of exploiting the information for 
their personal gain.147 
Stated differently, because Section 20(b) makes illegal violations of the 1934 Act 
committed “through or by means of any other person,” the Court reasoned that it 
outlawed trades by tippees that benefit insiders.148  While Dirks has received some 
negative treatment since it was decided with a number of jurisdictions declining to 
follow the opinion, in this context it remains good law. 
4.  Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Stringer149 
In this matter, the SEC contended it had standing to bring an 
enforcement action against a control person under Section 20(a) of the Exchange 
Act.150  The dispute concerned the burden of proof under Section 20(a) as 
compared to Section 20(b).151  According to the court, Section 20(a) shifts to the 
alleged controlling person the affirmative obligation to negate his or her role in 
the conduct underlying the claim by proving that he “acted in good faith and did 
not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause 
of action.”152  In contrast, the court found that Section 20(b) contains no such 
provision and leaves the burden of proof against a control person squarely on the 
                                                
145 Id. at 1314.   
146 Id. at 1315. 
147 Dirks v. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983). 
148 Margaret V. Sachs, The Relevance of Tort Law Doctrines to Rule 10b-5: Should Careless Plaintiffs Be 
Denied Recovery?, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 96 (1985). 
149 Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Stringer, No. Civ. 02-1341-ST, 2003 WL 23538011, at *1 (D. Or. 2003).  
150 Id. at *3 (D. Or. Sept. 3, 2003) 
151 Id.  
152 Id.  
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SEC.153  The court stated the Ninth Circuit has not addressed this issue and that 
two of the other circuits disagree.154  The SEC argued and the Second Circuit 
previously held that the SEC may bring an enforcement action under Section 
20(a).155  But, Stringer and the Sixth Circuit156 take the opposite view.157  In this 
opinion, the District court concluded “the only way to harmonize the two 
provisions … is to read § 20(a) as a private claim and § 20(b) as an enforcement 
claim.”158   
In examining Section 20(b), the court finds it is “specifically geared 
toward government enforcement actions.  Section 20(b) is [titled] ‘unlawful 
activity through or by means of any other person’ and provides a mechanism for 
the SEC to enforce violations of the securities laws committed ‘through or by 
means of’ other persons.159  Notably, the court also states that “Sections 20(a) and 
20(b) create secondary liability [, the] difference being that Section 20(a) puts the 
burden on the defendant to prove an affirmative defense to avoid liability.”160  
The opinion also comments on both Sections 20(b) and 20(c) using the term 
“unlawful” and this is noticeably absent in Section 20(a) which instead uses the 
term “liable.”161  As a result, the court determined “[t]his difference in 
                                                
153 Id.  
154 Id.  
155Id. See Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1472 (2nd Cir. 1996), cert 
denied, 522 U.S. 812, 118 S.Ct. 57, 139 L.Ed.2d 21 (1997). 
156 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that because § 20(b) of the Exchange Act “sets forth the standard 
of lawfulness to which a controlling person must conform, on penalty of liability in injunction to 
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under section 20(a)” and that the SEC could not rely on § 20(a) when seeking personal injunctions 
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Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §929P(c), 124 Stat. 1376, 1864 (2010). 
157 Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1318 (6th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 420 U.S. 908, 95 S.Ct. 826, 42 L.Ed.2d 
837 (1975). 
158 Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Stringer, No. Civ. 02-1341-ST, 2003 WL 23538011, at *1, *2 (D. Or. 
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terminology cannot be ignored and lends credence to the interpretation that 
Section 20(a) does not include an enforcement action by the SEC.”162   
Here, “the SEC argued Section 20(b) was intended as an ‘aiding and 
abetting catch-all’ provision to allow the SEC to pursue an enforcement action 
against officers and directors for violating any provision of the securities laws that 
does not itself have the ‘direct or indirect’ language.163  However, the court 
rejected this argument using the reasoning of Central Bank,” stating that the 
“directly or indirectly” language shows that “Congress ... intended to reach all 
persons who engage, even if only indirectly, in proscribed activities connected 
with securities transactions.”164165  Also, “aiding and abetting liability extends 
beyond persons who engage, even indirectly, in a proscribed activity; aiding and 
abetting liability reaches persons who do not engage in the proscribed activities at 
all, but who give a degree of aid to those who do.”166  Moreover, “allowing 
enforcement actions by the SEC under Section 20(a) would render Section 20(b) 
superfluous.”167  This is because “[u]nder Section 20(b), the scienter requirement 
will differ depending on the underlying violation.”168  “Section 20(a) has no 
scienter requirement, but instead  allows a control person to raise the good faith 
defense.”169   
Regardless, the court also analyzed two situations the SEC identified 
where the SEC argued “it would be unable to pursue an enforcement action 
under Section 20(b), but would be able to do so under Section 20(a).170  First is 
the situation where a director, acting in good faith, orders the corporation to take 
an action without knowing how the action could be used by the corporation, and 
the corporation takes that action which violates the securities laws.171  In that 
situation, the director may have acted in “good faith,” but did not induce the 
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163 Id. at *13. 
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165 Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 175-76 (1994). 
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violation to occur and, therefore, cannot prove the Section 20(a) defense.172  The 
second scenario is where a CEO orders the corporation's finance department to 
reduce expenses and the sales department to increase revenues, and then imposes 
unrealistic goals with incentives, resulting in a securities violation by the 
corporation.173  In that situation, even though the CEO may not have induced the 
corporate act, he did not act in “good faith” and, therefore, cannot prove the 
Section 20(a) defense.174  Although these examples on their face would allow 
enforcement under Section 20(a), they also appear to allow enforcement under 
Section 20(b) under the theory that the person “indirectly” did some act which 
violated the securities laws.”175   
This last comment was an interesting and unexpected result by the court, 
which concluded that both sections impose secondary liability on persons who act 
by and through others.176  Whether or not this latter point has any merit will be 
examined later, as there is questionable support for the court’s rationale. 
5.  Sec. Exch. Comm’n  v. J.W. Barclay & Co. 
The SEC initiated administrative proceedings against Barclay, determined 
there were multiple violations and ordered Barclay to pay a $25,000 penalty.177  
Thereafter, Barclay ceased operations as a broker-dealer and violated the SEC’s 
net capital requirements.178  Also, one of Barclay’s founders, who also happened 
to be Barclay’s President and a majority shareholder, John Bruno, directed Barclay 
not to use any of its funds to pay any part of the $25,000 penalty.179  As a result, 
the SEC filed an application against Barclay and Bruno in District Court.180  
Bruno argued that the SEC could not assert control person liability against him 
under Section 20(a) “and hold him responsible for the civil penalty against 
Barclay” because Bruno was not a party to the proceedings before the SEC and 
no order was issued against him.181 
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The District Court granted the SEC’s motion for summary judgment, 
Bruno appealed and the Third Circuit appointed an attorney as amicus curiae to 
address whether the SEC has standing to bring a control person claim under 
Section 20(a).182  Here, the Third Circuit stated that “in order for Bruno to be 
jointly and severally liable under § 20(a): (1) the SEC has to be a person; (2) to 
whom the controlled person, Barclay, was liable; (3) as a result of some act or acts 
constituting a violation or cause of action under any provision of the Exchange 
Act or any rule or regulation thereunder.”183  Holding that the SEC is a person 
within the meaning of Section 20(a) and declining to join in the Sixth Circuit’s 
contrary holding in Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Coffey, the Third Circuit stated that the 
relevant liability of the controlled person for the purpose of defining the control 
person's joint and several liability under § 20(a) is the controlled person's 
obligation to pay some amount to a creditor when that claim for payment arises 
under the securities laws.184  And because the facts were uncontested, Barclay was 
found to be liable under Section 20(a) for the unpaid penalty.185  Also, Bruno, 
having controlled Barclay, induced and was a culpable participant in the act 
constituting the cause of action, and was jointly and severally liable for the 
penalty.186  In reaching its conclusion, the Third Circuit stated, as follows: 
We further note that our construction of Section 20(a) serves the 
remedial purposes of the Exchange Act.  With a more narrow 
construction of Section 20(a), the deterrent effects of civil 
penalties arising under the Exchange Act would be diluted in cases 
such as this one where a closely-held firm is subject to a penalty, 
and the persons controlling the firm transfer the firm's assets to 
themselves, causing the firm to be unable to pay its penalty.  
Although Section 20(b) may provide an overlapping remedy in 
some such cases, control persons who induce the transfers of the 
firm's assets to themselves may not have participated in the 
underlying violations. In that sense, our cumulative construction 
of Section 20(b) and Section 20(a) targets different forms of 
wrongdoing, and thus Section 20(a), given our construction, could 
reach wrongdoers who might otherwise escape liability under 
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Section 20(b).  Consequently, our construction of Section 20(a) is 
also supported by the remedial purposes of the Exchange Act.187 
In a footnote, the Third Circuit also stated that it agreed with the Sixth 
Circuit in Coffey that Section 20(b), not Section 20(a), defines the general 
“standard of lawfulness to which a controlling person must conform.”188  It also 
accepted the reasoning from Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Stringer that while a control 
person could be held liable in an SEC enforcement action under Section 20(b) for 
certain violations committed by a controlled person, in such a case the SEC itself 
would not be an “injured party,” and the defendants in such an enforcement 
action would not be “liable to the SEC the way that [they] would be liable to a 
private plaintiff.”189 
6.  Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Daifotis, 
In this matter, the court disagreed with the Stringer decision, stating as 
follows: “The SEC is a government agency tasked with enforcing federal 
securities laws.  It is not an injured party.”190  Relying on Security Exchange 
Commission v. Zanford,191 the court explained that federal securities laws should be 
construed “not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate [their] 
remedial purposes.”192  It also held that the SEC, the very agency charged with 
enforcing federal securities laws, can hold control persons liable and that the 
opposite result would contradict the purpose of securities laws.193   
As a result of this decision, a split exists as to whether the SEC may 
pursue claims under Section 20(a).  Whether it will be resolved favorably for 
FINRA and the SEC remains to be seen, but the natural result should be that the 
government enforcement agencies should be able to pursue these claims.  This is 
because there was no such limit imposed in the language of Section 20(a) or that 
arose during the debates on the legislative history.   
 
                                                
187 Id.  
188 Id. at 843 (citing Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1318 (6th Cir. 1974)). 
189 Barclay, 442 F.3d at 843 (citing Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Stringer, No. Civ. 02-1341-ST, 2003 WL 
23538011 at *1, *6 (D. Or. Sept. 3, 2003)).  
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Oct. 7, 2011). 
191 535 U.S. 813, 815 (2002). 
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D.  SEC Administrative Decisions 
In the 1930s, after the passage of the ’34 Act, the SEC pursued multiple 
Section 20(b) claims in conjunction with Section 9 violations.  During this period, 
the SEC was keen on pursuing brokers and other entities who were using 
“matched orders” to buy and sell stock to manipulate the price.  While many 
examples of the SEC’s cases from this period exist and are easily located, the 
overwhelming majority of them concerned setting matters for hearing and did not 
result in a meaningful, substantive decision, except for the following matter.   
1. In the Matter of Junius A. Richards 
In this case, the SEC alleged that Richards, a broker, had reason to believe 
that an investment banking firm, Robert Benson & Co., Ltd. (Benson), an English 
investment banking firm, and its subsidiary, British Financial Union, Ltd., were 
entering orders for the purchase and sale of the common stock of Simplicity 
Pattern Company, Inc.194  The SEC’s order stated that Richards also knew that 
the banking entities were effecting transactions to create actual or apparent active 
trading in the stock to raise its price.195  As a punishment, the SEC suspended 
Richards’ membership on multiple exchanges based on his conduct in violation of 
Section 19(a)(3).196  However, the SEC also determined that Benson violated 
Section 9(a)(1)(B), 9(a)(1)(C), and 9(a)(2) of the ’34 Act for matching orders.197  
Furthermore, the SEC’s order concluded that because the transactions were 
executed through brokers, the banks were also violating Section 20(b) of the Act, 
“which [made] it unlawful for a person to do by means of any other person any 
act or thing which it would be unlawful for such person to do directly.”198 Based 
on this language, it suggests that the SEC would have pursued the banks for a 
Section 20(b) violation as “controlling persons” over Richards.  However, the 
record does not reflect whether the SEC ever pursued these claims, which is 
unsurprising given the potential difficulty for enforcing violations against foreign 
entities in 1939.199 
 
                                                
194 In the Matter of Junius A. Richards, Exchange Act Release No. 708, 4 SEC Docket 742, No. 4-
15, 1939 WL 39102 at *1 (Mar. 24, 1939). 
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2. Additional Section 20(b) Claims 
In 1986, the SEC issued a litigation release on a case involving insider 
trading with alleged violations of Section 20(b) and Rule 10b-5.200  Although the 
matter resulted in a settlement with some of the defendants, all of the relief 
concerned the insider trading violation, not the Section 20(b) claim.   
While the SEC has filed additional complaints alleging Section 20(b) 
violations, none of them have been litigated to conclusion since 1986. 
E. FINRA Decision Affecting a Section 20(b) Claim 
1.  In the Matter of Department of Market Regulation v. Gregory Richard Imbruce201 
In this matter, Gregory Imbruce was a portfolio manager who supervised 
an assistant trader, Peter Berkowitz, for the Madoff Securities’ energy portfolio.202  
In these roles, Berkowitz took instructions from Imbruce on trading.203  On 
November 14, 2007, Imbruce was heading out of town and called Berkowitz.204  
According to Imbruce, he instructed Berkowitz to short $500,000 in value of 
“any” energy stock to reduce the portfolio’s net long position.205  Berkowitz 
disputed this, testifying that Imbruce instructed him to short sell 10,000 shares of 
a specific stock, ATP Oil & Gas Corporation (ATPG).  Regardless, Berkowitz did 
in fact sell short 10,000 shares of ATPG that day between $52.00 and $53.30 per 
share.206  That same day, ATPG filed a prospectus with the SEC and a 
supplement stating that “ATPG intended to initiate a secondary public offering of 
[five] million shares of common stock at a price of $47.00 per share.”207  After the 
market closed, Imbruce submitted an indication of interest on behalf of Madoff 
                                                
200 Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Certain Unknown Purchasers of the Common Stock of and Call 
Options for the Common Stock of Santa Fe Int’l Corp., Faisal Al Massoud Al Fuhaid, and Luay 
Tewfik Al Swaidi, 81 CIV. 6553 (WCC) (S.D.N.Y.), Exchange Act Release No. 11012, 35 S.E.C. 
Docket 183, 1986 WL 70986 at *1 (Feb. 26 1986).  
201 In the Matter of Department of Market Regulation v. Gregory Richard Imbruce, 2012 WL 
759812 (N.A.S.D.R. Mar. 7, 2012) (Note: This may be cited alternatively as In the Matter of 
Department of Market Regulation v. Gregory Richard Imbruce, Complaint No. 2008012137601 (2012)). 
202  Imbruce, 2012 WL 759812, at *1-2. 
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Securities to purchase 10,000 shares of ATPG in the secondary public offering.208  
The next morning, Imbruce accepted the allocation and Berkowitz was notified of 
the purchase, acknowledging the transaction and entering it into Madoff 
Securities’ internal system.209  As a result of Imbruce’s purchase of ATPG on 
November 15, 2007, coupled with the short sales on November 14, 2007, Madoff 
Securities realized a profit of $58,721.26.210   
The spike in short sales of ATPG’s stock was observed by market 
surveillance, and a complaint was filed against Imbruce alleging that “[he] violated 
Exchange Act Rule 105 and NASD Rule 2110 because he purchased shares of 
ATPG in a secondary public offering … after he sold the company's stock short 
during the restricted period.211  The Hearing Panel found that Imbruce violated 
Exchange Act Rule 105 and NASD Rule 2110, as alleged in the complaint.212  It 
accepted that Berkowitz’s testimony as credible, that Imbruce’s testimony was not 
credible, and that Imbruce had instructed Berkowitz to short sell 10,000 shares of 
ATPG.213  On appeal, Imbruce offered a variety of arguments, but FINRA 
affirmed that Berkowitz's short sales of ATPG were attributable to Imbruce for 
purposes of Exchange Act Rule 105.214   
Imbruce argued that Exchange Act Rule 105 required that the same person 
effect the short sale and purchase of the subject securities and that he did not 
violate Exchange Act Rule 105 because he did not short sell ATPG.215  FINRA 
rejected this argument, stating: 
Imbruce misunderstands the Exchange Act’s broad, remedial 
approach to securities regulation.  The Exchange Act, by its own 
terms, prohibits individuals from engaging in unlawful activities by 
means of other persons.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(b) (2011) (“It shall 
be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to do any act or 
thing which it would be unlawful for such person to do under the 
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provisions of this title or any rule or regulation thereunder 
through or by means of any other person.”).216  
Consequently, FINRA determined that Imbruce was responsible for the 
subject short sales, despite the fact that Berkowitz executed the actual trades.217  
This finding, coupled with the finding that Imbruce purchased ATPG in the 
company’s secondary public offering from a participating underwriter, was 
sufficient to establish Imbruce’s violation of Exchange Act Rule 105.218   
One interesting aspect of this case is that FINRA did not actually charge 
Imbruce with a Section 20(b) violation, but instead raised the issue sua sponte.  
Why FINRA chose not to pursue a Section 20(b) against Berkowitz and Imbruce 
is unclear, especially because no scienter is required to prove a violation of  
Exchange Act Rule 105,  “…a prophylactic, [that] providing a bright line 
demarcation of proscribed conduct, and applies irrespective of a short seller’s 
intent.”219  Consequently, it would have been easy for FINRA to prove that 
Berkowitz made the short sale as a “controlled person” and that Imbruce was the 
“controlling person.”  It is possible that Berkowitz’s employment situation 
provides a reasonable explanation – his employment with Madoff Securities was 
terminated on March 11, 2008 and FINRA admitted it no longer had jurisdiction 
over him as of March 11, 2010. 220  Thus, because Berkowitz was apparently no 
longer working in the industry as a registered representative, there was little to be 
gained in pursuing him from a deterrence standpoint, compared to Imbruce.  
Alternatively, it is likely that FINRA was seeking Berkowitz’s testimony in a 
cooperative capacity against Imbruce, which would be considerably more difficult 
if he was charged as a controlled person.  Also, the complaint against Imbruce 
was not filed until February 25, 2010, and FINRA’s jurisdiction over Berkowitz 
expired two weeks later.The opinion also stated that while Berkowitz appeared 
for an interview, he later declined to testify voluntarily at Imbruce’s hearing. 
Consequently, it may have been challenging to locate him and easier to pursue 
Imbruce.  Nevertheless, with the decision having been published on March 7, 
2012, it shows that Section 20(b) claims are alive and well. 
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220 Pursuant to FINRA’s By-Laws, Art. V, Sec. 4, persons who are no longer registered with a 
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2.  Additional Guidance from FINRA on Section 20(b) 
As a prime example of how rarely claims arise under Section 20(b), the 
Imbruce decision is the only one to date reported by FINRA.  Additionally, the 
only other reference to Section 20(b) appears in a 1988 release in Notice 88-62, 
Rule 10B-21, which prohibits shorting into secondary offerings.221  The Rule 
prohibits purchases of offered securities to cover short sales made during the 
specified period and it proscribes covering purchases made directly from an 
underwriter, broker, or dealer participating in the offering.222  In particular, the 
Release states:   
Moreover, such covering purchases effected by prearrangement or 
other understanding through other purchasers in the primary 
offering are proscribed through the operation of Section 20(b) of 
the Exchange Act, which prohibits a person from doing indirectly 
any act that he is prohibited from doing directly by the Exchange 
Act or any rule thereunder.  Thus, the “prearrangement” of the 
sort that the NASD believes may have been present in the cases it 
investigated would be prohibited by Rule 10b-21(T) through the 
operation of Section 20(b).223 
In a footnote, the Release further states: “Although Section 20 is entitled 
“Liabilities of Controlling Persons,” paragraph (b) is not limited to situations 
involving persons in control relationships.”224  While this footnote is intriguing, 
without more detail it is challenging to determine what FINRA was 
contemplating in this regard. 
IV. SUMMARY OF VIEWS PROVIDED BY COMMENTATORS 
Since 1934, many commentators have set forth their views on Section 
20(b) and its potential use. The following sets forth a summary of their opinions 
concerning the legislative history, its application and the meaning behind Section 
20(b).  For ease of reference, the comments are provided as they were originally 
published, in chronological order. 
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A.  William B. Herlands – 1934 
An early analysis of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 examines 
“the statutory provisions from the point of view of criminal liability, … 
classify[ing] them into one of three general types”: 
(1) Absolute and unqualified prohibitions; i.e., statutory provisions 
prohibiting the doing of certain acts under all circumstances; 
(2) Conditional and qualified prohibitions; i.e., statutory provisions 
referring in general terms to the prohibition of certain acts, the 
extent and details of such prohibitions to be determined by the 
rules and regulations of the Commission and the Federal Reserve 
Board; and, 
(3) Affirmative requirements; i.e., statutory provisions requiring 
the doing of certain acts.225 
Citing to testimony from the Senate Hearings, Mr. Herlands asserts “[t]he 
provisions may be classified functionally into four fields of regulation: (a) The 
control of credit that flows into the stock market; (b) The protection of investors 
from evils that are possible under existing stock market machinery; (c) The 
protection of investors from ignorance and exploitation by large inside operators; 
and, (d) The regulation of over-the-counter markets in unlisted securities with 
resulting protection to securities listed on registered exchanges.”226  Under this 
framework, although Mr. Herlands did not specify, a reasonable interpretation is 
that subsections (b) and (c) would be the most likely categories for Section 20(b) 
to be utilized to protect investors.    
Moreover, Mr. Herlands classifies violations of Section 20(b) in the 
category of violations where an absolute and unqualified prohibition exists.227  He 
also characterizes Section 20(b) as the “principal-accessory rule.”228   
 
 
 
                                                
225 William B. Herlands, Criminal Law Aspects of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 21 No. 2 VA. L. 
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226 Id. at 150, n.31(citing Testimony of T. G. Corcoran, S. Hearings, 6465-66; Testimony of L. J. 
Stern, S. Hearings, 6973-74; Testimony of T. G. Gay, S. Hearings, 6587). 
227 Id. at 150.   
228 Id. at 168. 
2015] CATCHING THE MAN BEHIND THE MAN: WHY THE SEC AND FINRA 321 
SHOULD CAPITALIZE ON SECTION 20(B) TO PURSUE CONTROL PERSONS 
B.  Bernard Wexler229 –1975 
While the Securities Act was wending its way through Congress, the 
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency was looking into malpractices in the 
trading markets.230   
That investigation (commonly called the “Pecora Hearings”) 
uncovered a wealth of material about manipulation, insider 
trading, breaches of fiduciary duty by the  controlling persons of 
corporations and other strategically situated people who profited 
handsomely out of the financial distress of the companies that 
they dominated.  It showed how these persons sold the stocks of 
their own companies short, concealed material information, and 
engaged in other malpractices.231   
Mr. Wexler also commented as follows:  
Complying with that direction, the Commission made an 
exhaustive study of the … investment company industry. Its 
report, known as the “Investment Trust Study,” found that to an 
alarming extent investment companies had been operated in the 
interests of their managers and to the detriment of investors. A 
high incidence of recklessness and improvidence was also noted. 
Insiders often viewed investment companies as sources of capital 
for business ventures of their own and as captive markets for 
unsalable securities that they, the insiders, wished to convert into 
cash. Controlling persons frequently took unfair advantage of the companies 
in other ways, often using broad exculpatory clauses to insulate them from 
liability for their wrongdoing. Outright larceny and embezzlement were 
not uncommon. Managers were able to buy investment company 
shares for less than net asset value, thus enriching themselves at 
the shareholders’ expense.232   
                                                
229 Bernard Wexler, Director of the Office of Opinions and Review, wrote a history of the SEC in 
its first forty years, which was published in 2003; see, Karl Smeltzer, Memories From Early Days of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (2004), 
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/2000/2004_0601_Smeltzer_Memories.pdf. 
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Taken in context with the Pecora hearings, Mr. Wexler’s statement about 
controlling persons appears to be entirely consistent with the views espoused by 
Thomas G. Corcoran and Ferdinand Pecora.233 
C.  Unknown Author – 1978 
In this article, the author argues that “controlling person liability should 
be viewed as a subset of the general liability in section 20(b) for those who violate 
the law through others.”234  The author states: “Under this view, the 
demonstration of a control relationship would establish a prima facie violation of 
section 20(b) through the use of intermediaries, and would shift the focus of 
analysis to the controlling person sections, where the burden is upon the 
defendant to establish the applicability of exculpatory language.”235  According to 
the author, “a finding of controlling person status has a ‘dramatic’ effect upon a 
defendant in a securities action because he then has the burden of establishing a 
defense.”236 Thus, “courts should carefully scrutinize allegations of control and 
remove the controlling person sections from the context of agency.”237  The 
author adds: “By viewing controlling person liability as a subset of the general 
liability of those who accomplish violations through others, courts may gain a 
perspective on the provisions that will help prevent hasty findings of controlling 
person status and liability.”238  Also, “[i]f … the conceptual basis for imposing 
liability is to punish those who violate through others rather than to reinforce a 
pre-existing duty to supervise, much confusion in the status phase of controlling 
person analysis can be eliminated and better decisions produced.”239 
While the author acknowledges that Section 20(b) has not been used as a 
vehicle to serve the rule of respondeat superior and has apparently been ignored, the 
challenge with this particular commentary is that the author mainly discusses 
Section 20(a) violations because of the absence of any decisions involving Section 
20(b) claims.240  Because there are differences in the provisions, this makes it 
                                                
233 FERDINAND PECORA, WALL STREET UNDER OATH: THE STORY OF OUR MODERN MONEY 
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difficult to lump them together in a discussion; for example, Section 20(a) makes 
control persons “liable” instead of the Section 20(b) “unlawful” language and 
Section 20(a) provides a good faith defense, where this is not available for Section 
20(b).241   
D.  William J. Fitzpatrick and Ronald T. Carman – 1983 
Fitzpatrick and Carman state that the majority view permits plaintiffs to 
predicate liability on a respondeat superior theory in actions against broker-dealers 
and accounting firms alleging violations of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 and that 
Section 20(a) does not provide the exclusive means for holding a controlling party 
liable for violations of the federal securities laws by its agents.242  In contrast, the 
authors contend that the minority view holds that section 20(a) is the exclusive 
source of liability.243   
In discussing the issue, Fitzpatrick and Carman obtained an amicus brief 
filed by the SEC and they quote from it selectively.244  In doing so, the authors 
state that the SEC argued that respondeat superior liability is consistent with the 
statutory good faith defense provided in Exchange Act section 20(a).245  However, 
in disagreeing with the SEC’s position, they assert that Section 20(a) precludes the 
application of the common law doctrine of respondeat superior.246  Fitzpatrick and 
Carman also conclude that the SEC relied “on remarks in the legislative history to 
                                                
241 Section 20(a) provides, as follows:  
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person 
liable under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or 
regulation thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally 
with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any 
person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the 
controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or 
indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or 
cause of action. 
15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2011). 
242William J. Fitzpatrick and Ronald T. Carman, Respondeat Superior and the Federal Securities Laws: A 
Round Peg in a Square Hole, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1983) (emphasis added). 
243 Id. at 4. 
244 Id. at 25, n.28. Although the authors provide a citation for the SEC’s amicus brief at n. 158, the 
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Westlaw or other legal databases.  Whether a copy may be available in the archives of the Seventh 
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the effect that the control provisions were designed ‘to prevent evasion of the 
provisions of the [laws] by organizing dummies who will undertake the actual 
things forbidden by the section.”247  Instead, the authors adopt the following 
position:     
Upon closer examination it appears that these remarks were 
primarily addressed to section 20(b), not 20(a).  With referring to 
the two sections, the report of the Committee on Interstate 
Commerce stated that section 20(a) makes "a person who controls 
a person . . . liable to the same extent as the person controlled 
unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not 
induce the act in question," while section 20(b) "makes it unlawful 
for any person to do, through any other person, anything that he 
is forbidden to do himself."  It appears then that Exchange Act 
section 20(b), not 20(a), was specifically aimed at the "dummy" 
situation.248 
Regardless of Section 20(a)’s non-exclusivity, Robert Prentice rebutted 
Fitzpatrick and Carman’s argument in 1997. Prentice argued that this thinking was 
fatally flawed because all the “dummy” references in the legislative history of the 
1933 Act were to section 15.249   Comparing Section 15 to Section 20(a), he asserts 
that Section 20(a) was drawn nearly verbatim from Section 15 and adopted for 
the same exact reasons.250  Also, Mr. Prentice’s view is that there is no section 
20(b) parallel provision in section 15.251  Consequently, he contends as follows: 
Section 20(b) remains a mysterious provision that, although it has 
been seldom invoked, seems on its face to contradict any claim 
that section 20(a) provides the only form of secondary liability.  
Indeed, section 20(b) can plausibly be read to authorize 
imposition of respondeat superior liability, although no court has so 
held.252    
                                                
247 Id. at 26. (quoting Fitzpatrick and Carman, Respondeat Superior and the Federal Securities Laws: A 
Round Peg in a Square Hole, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1983)). 
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While Fitzpatrick/Carman may have been correct in part that Section 
20(b) was aimed at dummies, as is evident from the legislative history that 
contains numerous references to dummies, Prentice’s interpretation is also 
important because of his approach concerning the legislative intent.  In fact, 
Prentice makes a compelling argument “that in drafting section 15 and section 
20(a), Congress was not even thinking about the liability of employers for their 
employees.”253  He explained that corporations, accounting firms, and law firms 
do not “‘stand in the shadows’ manipulating their agents or act through 
‘dummies.’ Furthermore, they should “answer for the torts of their agents 
irrespective of the existence of section 20(a).”254  The reason for this is that “in 
enacting section 20(a), Congress was trying to extend liability beyond the master-
servant relationship, where respondeat superior liability already universally applied, in 
order to reach additional, hidden malefactors.”255  Thus, “the controlling person 
liability provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts were aimed primarily at situations 
of control over firms (and others) by behind-the-scenes actors.”256  Also, 
“enactment of the controlling person provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts ‘was 
motivated by a fear that traditional theories of secondary liability, such as agency, 
would not prove adequate, in every case, to extend liability to those who were 
'really responsible' for violations of the securities laws.’”257   
While much of Prentice’s analysis focuses on Section 20(a), it is important 
because he makes a strong case for the breadth in scope of control person liability 
anticipated by the drafters of the ’34 Act.  Notably, this view is contrary to the 
opinion of the Sixth Circuit in SEC v. Coffey.258 
E.  William H. Kuehnle – 1989 
Kuehnle examines the differences between the control relationship in the 
statutory provisions and the principal-agent relationship in agency law, concluding 
that they are not mutually exclusive. 259  Instead, he persuasively articulates that 
Congress merely intended to provide an additional basis of secondary liability 
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with its own limiting provisions.260  The language and legislative history of the 
controlling persons provisions demonstrate that the provisions are not exclusive 
and provide a helpful foundation for determining the proper application of the 
controlling person provisions in general.261   
In particular, referring to the House debates between Representatives Lea 
and Hollister, Kuehnle posits that the debates clearly indicated that the 
controlling person provisions were intended to reach beyond situations involving 
agency liability.262  The focus on control and the absence of any reference to 
common-law forms of secondary liability in the House report all indicate that the 
control person provisions were intended to be a special form of liability with its 
own limiting clause.263  “[T]he controlling person provisions originated as a device 
to reach a particular problem that agency or other secondary liability concepts 
might not reach.”264  
As an example, Kuehnle relies on Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act, which 
has been held to be a basis for liability in enforcement actions.265   However, none 
of the examples that he provides concern Section 20(b) violations.  Nevertheless, 
this may be partly attributed to the definition of control, which the drafters of the 
’34 Act intentionally avoided defining because of the many forms the term could 
take.266  In this aspect, Kuehnle believed that the House report’s reference to 
actual control was made to expand coverage beyond legal control rather than 
constrain the definition of control. Still, “ it indicate[d] an intent to require some 
degree of realistic control, as would be provided by legal or actual control.”267  
Additionally, he argues that the use of the term actual control should not be taken 
necessarily as a limitation.268  In citing Handy & Harmon, Congress simply 
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contrasted between the broader coverage of this provision and the Supreme 
Court’s narrow interpretation on the Internal Revenue Code.269   
On a related note, along the lines of semantics involving control, both the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 use the exact 
same definition of control: 
The term “control” (including the terms “controlling,” “controlled 
by” and “under common control with”) means the possession, 
direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of 
the management and policies of a person, whether through the 
ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.270 
F.  P. Gifford Carter – 2001 
Carter observes that “Section 20(b) has very little interpretative history 
that sheds light on what constitutes ‘through or by means of.’”271  While this may 
be true, it does not necessarily create an impediment for FINRA or the SEC to 
pursue Section 20(b) claims, as the FINRA v. Imbruce decision demonstrates.272   
Additionally, Carter states that “[m]ost section 20(b) claims are brought 
by the SEC itself because the courts have ruled that the SEC is unable to seek an 
injunction under section 20(a).273 For support, he relies upon SEC v. Coffey.”274  
However, as we will see in Section V, this is an untenable position when Coffey is 
examined critically and in terms of the trend towards increased penalties for 
violations of the federal securities laws.275 This is particularly evident in light of 
the trend to expand penalties, which has continually persisted since the passage of 
the 1990 Remedies Act, Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002 and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. 
Carter also asserts that “[d]espite the paucity of reported opinions 
regarding Section 20(b) liability, it is clear that at least two elements are required: 
knowing use of the controlled person by the controlling person and culpable 
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272 Supra, Section III, E. 
273 Supra, note 279, at 293-94. 
274 Id. at 294. 
275 See infra Part V. 
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participation in the violation.”276  There is a logical problem with this assertion.  
The first case that he cites arrives at the conclusion, in a footnote, that vicarious 
liability for criminal acts under § 20(b) requires allegations of knowledge and 
participation in a complaint.277  Moreover, the support for this, which appears at 
best to be dicta, is derived from Moss v. Morgan Stanley, 553 F.Supp. 1347, 1362 
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), which relied on Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. 
Coffey.  Since that time, Moss has only been cited twice where Section 20(b) is 
mentioned.  The first case states as follows: “few reported cases discuss the 
applicability of Section 20(b), but it is clear that the section requires a showing 
that a ‘controlling person knowingly used the controlled person to commit the 
illegal act.’”278  For support, Cohen relies on Moss and Coffey.279  However, because 
the reasoning of Coffey is unsupported, flawed, and likely to be overruled in the 
future, this is a weak position, and Rush does not provide meaningful support for 
Carter’s argument.   
Regardless, Mr. Carter concludes that “[i]n practice … Section 20(b) 
requires control, culpable participation, and a violation of the securities laws.”280  
Consequently, he believes that “any exposure under section 20(b) would also 
generate exposure under Section 20(a).”281  This reasoning is defective, however, 
because there are multiple differences between Section 20(a) and Section 20(b).282  
In spite of this, Carter assumes that “The only functional difference between the 
provisions is that the SEC can only use Section 20(b) when seeking injunctive 
relief.”283  This interpretation is erroneous and runs contrary to the majority of the 
reasoned logic applied by numerous commentators considering Section 20(b). 
G.  Andrew Gillman – 2012 
Gilman suggests that one problem is that while Section 20(b) of the 
Exchange Act may provide a means to address the loopholes that Janus Group v. 
First Derivative Trader284 created, the Supreme Court does not provide guidance on 
                                                
276 Supra, note 279, at 294.. 
277 See Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 628 F. Supp. 1188, 1196 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).   
278 Cohen v. Citibank, N.A., 954 F. Supp. 621, 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).   
279 See id.  
280 Supra, note 279, at 294. 
281 Id. 
282 Supra, note 58. 
283 Supra, note 279, at 294. 
284 Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011). 
2015] CATCHING THE MAN BEHIND THE MAN: WHY THE SEC AND FINRA 329 
SHOULD CAPITALIZE ON SECTION 20(B) TO PURSUE CONTROL PERSONS 
how to interpret the provision.285  In this regard, Gilman is correct and the 
Supreme Court will be left to address this open question in another case in the 
future.  Nevertheless, Gillman asserts that Janus may be interpreted so that the 
investment advisor would avoid liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 since it did 
not have “ultimate authority” over the statement, and the directors would skirt 
liability because they did not “make” the statement.286  However, if the investment 
advisor makes the false statements “through” the innocent corporation, Section 
20(b) would provide for liability against the investment advisor and fill the 
“loophole” that the Janus decision creates.287  This kind of thinking is entirely 
consistent with the history and scope of Section 20(b).  As such, Gilman contends 
that applied to Janus, JCF may be viewed as the “dummy” corporation, while JCM 
provided all of the investment services necessary to operate the Funds.288  
Additionally,  plaintiffs would still have to prove that JCM “controlled” JCF 
rather than acted “by means of” the fund.289   
Gillman’s article, which presents a thoughtful analysis of Janus, 
interestingly enough does not assert that plaintiffs would have to show “knowing 
use” that JCM controlled JCF.   
H.  Arnold S. Jacobs – 2014 
Jacobs wrote about the divide in Janus between Justices Thomas and 
Breyer.290  First, he characterizes it as the majority believing Section 20(b) is 
limited to the use of innocent intermediaries, while the dissent views the Section 
20(b) case law as undeveloped and believes Section 20(b) gives rise to a private 
right of action.291  Second, in terms of the elements of a Section 20(b) claim, 
Section 20(b) is very much like the “directly or indirectly” Rule 10b-5 wording292 
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because both address the liability of the source of a false statement when third 
parties disseminate that statement.293  Jacobs observes that there are three 
differences: 
[(1)] Rule 10b-5 imposes no requirement that the intermediary be 
innocent, as Justice Thomas read into Section 20(b).  Thus, Rule 
10b-5 but not Section 20(b) covers two guilty persons acting in 
concert, one who creates the misleading statement and the other 
who acts as the intermediary and conveys it to the public.  The 
source could be liable under Rule 10b-5 as we discussed for 
setting the lie in motion if the lie is attributed to him, and the 
person passing it on (the intermediary) could be held responsible 
because he “makes” the statement a second time when passing it 
on. Thus, there are two ultimate authorities, the person who was 
the ultimate authority at the source who decided to launch the 
misrepresentation and the person who was the ultimate authority 
at the intermediary who decided to pass on the misleading 
statement. When the source or intermediary is an entity, the entity 
or entities could be liable as well;  
[(2)] Rule 10b-5 requires that the false statement be attributed to 
the source for the source to be liable.  Section 20(b) contains no 
such requirement.  Thus, when a source starts a false rumor in an 
attempt to manipulate a stock's price upward, the source can be 
held liable for the consequences of persons repeating the rumor 
under Section 20(b) whether or not the rumor is attributed to the 
source, but 10b-5 liability will be visited on the source only if the 
source is mentioned when the rumor is repeated; and, 
(3) Rule 10b-5 may require more than attribution; it might require 
the plaintiff to prove something like the source intended the 
statement to be disseminated further, foresaw that the statement 
would be communicated to others, or did not restrict the use of 
the information to the original recipient.  Courts may or may not 
read into Section 20(b) a similar requirement.294 
Third, the majority declined to address the whether Section 20(b) created 
a private right of action, but the dissent clearly viewed that it does or it would not 
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have suggested a remand so that the plaintiff could add a Section 20(b) cause of 
action to its complaint.295    
In evaluating this distinction, because joint and several liability referenced 
in Section 20(a) can arise in both private civil litigation and in SEC enforcement 
actions, Jacobs suggests that courts should reach the same conclusion regarding 
Section 20(b).296  “In addition, the Section 20(b) words ‘It shall be unlawful’ also 
are the first words in Rule 10b-5, which gives rise to a private right of action. . . .  
Even when no private right of action exists, Section 20(b) is an available remedy 
for SEC and criminal actions.”297  In light of this, Jacobs presents a strong 
argument that Section 20(b) claims are available in government enforcement 
actions by the SEC and for private individuals.   
V. EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF JANUS  AND THE FUTURE OF SECTION 
20(b) CLAIMS 
Since Janus, there have been eight reported decisions referring to Section 
20(b).  However, none of the cases resolve the open questions that exist: 
• What does the legislative history reveal about the intent of the drafters of 
Section 20(b)? 
• Why should the Sixth Circuit’s decision in SEC v. Coffey be overruled 
entirely? 
• Are Section 20(b) claims viable in light of the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders? 
• What elements are necessary to prove Section 20(b) claims? 
• What kinds of Section 20(b) claims can we expect to see from FINRA 
and the SEC? 
 
A. The Scope and Intent of the Legislative History of Section 20(b) 
In considering the legislative history, the purpose of Section 20(b) was to 
prevent evasion of the provisions of the ’34 Act by hiding behind “dummies” and 
“dummy corporations” that would actually do the things forbidden by the law.298  
As an example, Mr. Corcoran described a bank or a broker controlling a separate 
entity dealing in securities that would commit violations of the federal securities 
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laws.299  The drafters made it explicitly clear that they did not want this kind of 
liability to be limited or narrowed, stating that it would be “impossible” to 
anticipate the many ways in which actual control may be exerted.300  Specific 
examples were offered by Representative Rayburn, including stock ownership, 
lease, contract and agency.  Because the statute was drafted simply and brilliantly, 
Section 20(b) can and should be utilized to pursue other violations where actual 
or legally enforceable control are present. 
Another example that was set forth by Ferdinand Pecora in his book 
“Wall Street Under Oath” is also useful because it demonstrates the complexity of 
situations involving dummies and control persons.  Russell Brown was the 
Chairman of the Board of the American Commercial Alcohol Company 
(ACAC).301  ACAC was organized in Maryland and Maryland law prevented the 
issuance of new stock for cash unless the shareholders were first given an 
opportunity to buy.302  However, a loophole existed if newly issued stock was 
exchanged for that of another corporation.303  Thus, Brown’s friends, K.B. 
Phagan and C.C. Capdevielle, consented to act as dummies.304  Two corporations 
were formed, Maister Laboratories Incorporated (Maister) and Noxon, 
Incorporated (Noxon).305  Phagan gave a promissory note for $180,000 for 
Maister and Capdevielle a promissory note for $270,000 for Noxon.306  In 
exchange for the notes, Messrs. Phagan and Capdevielle received all the shares 
from Maister and Noxon, which they then exchanged with ACAC for 25,000 
newly issued shares of its stock.307  While this technically complied with Maryland 
law, Brown’s motive was to manipulate the new shares to as high a price as 
possible.308  Accordingly, other associates of Brown were involved as dummies to 
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form a pool to stimulate interest in the stock and sell it to the public.309  Once the 
pool was in place, vigorous activity in buying and selling of the stock 
commenced.310  From May 2, 1993 to July 18, 1933, the shares went from $20 to 
$89.311  In addition to the pool manager, a broker known as a “specialist” 
confined to a few particular stocks, was brought in to buy and sell the stock.312  
The specialist, Wright, testified as follows: 
MR. PECORA: And as a rule what is the object sought to be 
accomplished by those persons who organize a pool account in 
order to make a market in the stock? 
MR. WRIGHT: To redistribute the stock at a higher price if 
possible. 
MR. PECORA: That is, to raise the price level of the stock as 
much as possible? 
MR. WRIGHT: Yes, sir.313 
The result of the pool’s operation was to net $210,000 profit to the pool’s 
members, including Brown, but the public was left holding the bag after the stock 
price plummeted from $89 to $30 by July 22, 1933.314  The public, not realizing 
that the stock was being manipulated, suffered massive losses as a result of the 
manipulation, while Mr. Wright personally earned his own separate profit of 
$138,000 for the month of July 1933.315   
With the passage of Section 20(b), this would have provided government 
agencies and private individuals the ability to obtain relief from Brown as a 
controlling person for his control over the pool, the pool’s manager and the 
trading specialist.   
B. Why Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Coffey Should Be Overturned Entirely 
Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Coffey is an unusual decision for several reasons.  
Although the opinion contains thirty-four footnotes with references, the use of 
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citations is abandoned before the discussion of Section 20(b) begins.  This is 
noteworthy because the opinion sets forth no authority for many of the 
conclusions that are drawn about Section 20(b) and its scope and applicability to 
such claims.  To be clear, this does not mean that the authority is disagreeable; 
rather, it is non-existent.  What is especially troubling about this fact is that 
multiple cases have cited the decision favorably for numerous propositions 
concerning Section 20(b) that are unsupported, erroneous or outdated.   
The first problem with Coffey is its determination that there is a 
requirement for “knowing use.” Stated differently, Coffey requires proof that the 
controlling person “knowingly used” the controlled person.  However, the 
express language of Section 20(b) concerns unlawful acts and cannot reasonably 
be interpreted to include “knowing use” as a basis for liability.  Another problem 
is that Coffey appears to suggest that Section 20(b) claims must have derivative 
liability.  Concerning both of these issues, no such requirements were ever 
discussed in the legislative history of Section 20(b).  In fact, even critics of Section 
20(b) did not advance these arguments before the ’34 Act was passed.  Also, no 
cases decided prior to Coffey ever imposed this condition.  Regardless, in 
examining the “knowing use” requirement, a reasonable interpretation is that 
Coffey seeks to impose scienter as a prerequisite for liability.  While common sense 
and logic mandate that a separate, underlying unlawful act, the proof of which 
requires scienter, must be proved with scienter, there is no justification or support 
for creating a separate and unique scienter requirement that applies to Section 
20(b) claims.  Moreover, such a condition is inconsistent with the goal of 
addressing control person liability because there are situations where violations of 
the federal securities laws occur where there is “knowing use.”   
As an example, in the Imbruce case, Imbruce used Berkowitz to engage in 
prohibited short selling in violation of Rule 105.  If FINRA had been required to 
prove that Imbruce “knowingly used” Berkowitz, it is unclear whether FINRA 
would have prevailed, assuming it pursued a Section 20(b) claim.  While the 
hearing panel determined that Imbruce’s testimony was not credible, Imbruce 
denied instructing Berkowitz to short $500,000 of ATPG’s stock to reduce the 
portfolio’s net long position.  Without more evidence to resolve the “he said, he 
said” dispute between Imbruce and Berkowitz or evidence showing Imbruce’s 
state of mind, FINRA may not have had enough evidence to pursue a Section 
20(b) claim if knowing use was imposed.  The problem is that this creates a 
potential loophole for individuals to commit technical violations of the securities 
laws and then disclaim knowledge to avoid the imposition of Section 20(b).  In 
light of the original purpose of Section 20(b), such a result would be contrary to 
the intent of the drafters.   
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The second problem with Coffey is that the Sixth Circuit concludes that 
“broad liability” for violations was not the congressional intent, but it also fails to 
provide any support for this position.  In fact, one critic of Section 20(b) voiced 
the concern that control person liability should be limited where the controlling 
person “makes use of other persons” to evade the act.316  Although this group’s 
opposition appeared to desire some kind of use, whether knowing or not, the 
drafters expressly rejected this argument. As a result, for anyone carefully 
examining this issue in the future, it will be extremely difficult to persuasively 
argue that the legislative intent of the drafters was to impose any use requirement, 
whether it is knowing or not.  
The third issue with Coffey is the declaration that Section 20(b) cannot be 
used by the SEC except to pursue an injunction.  Without conceding that this 
may have been an accurate statement in 1974, it is highly unlikely that this is a 
correct statement of law in 2014.  This is because the opinion justified this based 
on 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e), which was re-designated as § 78u(d) and amended shortly 
after the decision was published.317  Additionally, the laws concerning remedies 
and penalties have been revised multiple times since this case was decided.  In 
1990, Congress passed the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock 
Reform Act (the “Remedies Act”), which, among other things, gave the SEC 
authority generally to seek civil money penalties in enforcement cases.318  More 
recently, the amount and scope of remedies was vastly expanded by the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) in 
2010.  Consequently, § 78u(d)(3) provides as follows:  
Whenever … any person has violated any provision of this 
chapter, the rules or regulations thereunder, or a cease-and-desist 
order entered by the Commission pursuant to section 78u-3 of 
this title, … the Commission may bring an action in a United 
States district court to seek, and the court shall have jurisdiction to 
impose, upon a proper showing, a civil penalty to be paid by the 
person who committed such violation.319 
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Consequently, if the SEC can pursue a Section 20(b) claim in district 
court, then it may recover civil penalties.  Nevertheless, even if the SEC is forced 
to pursue Section 20(b) claims in an administrative proceeding, this would not 
prevent the SEC from recovering civil penalties based on the statutory tier 
amounts.  Thus, if the latter situation applies, then the SEC could not recover the 
gross amount of pecuniary gain to the defendant in the administrative forum. 
The fourth problem with Coffey is that it held that the SEC could not 
pursue Section 20(a) claims and that it could only pursue Section 20(b) claims to 
seek injunctive relief.  Nevertheless, Dodd-Frank overruled Coffey in part by 
specifically including the SEC as a “person” with standing to pursue both Section 
20(a) and Section 20(b) claims. 
C. The Janus Decision Opens the Door to Section 20(b) Claims 
Based on the foregoing, there are multiple compelling reasons for the 
Sixth Circuit and ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court, to overrule the Coffey 
decision, in the event that a party attempts to rely on Coffey or its progeny to 
justify the following: 
• Imposing a “knowing use” requirement as a pre-requisite to establishing 
control person liability; 
• Arguing that the legislative history discourages “broad liability” for 
violations;  
• Dismissing a case brought by the SEC based on standing; and, 
• Preventing the SEC from obtaining civil monetary penalties and other 
appropriate fines and remedies and relief beyond an injunction. 
A plain reading of Janus demonstrates the Court’s interest in Section 20(b) 
claims as a means of alternate liability when others, such as Rule 10b-5, may be 
unavailable.  In fact, one commentator, Gillman, artfully revisited Janus, viewing 
the framework with JCM as the investment adviser who “made” the statement – 
(as a controlling person) – and JCF acted as the dummy with “ultimate control” – 
(as the controlled person).  However, Section 20(b) may also be greatly expanded 
in the future, as previously envisioned by the SEC in a multitude of situations, as 
seen in the next section. 
D. What Kinds of Claims May the SEC Bring to Enforce Section 20(b)? 
Oddly, if not remarkably, neither the SEC, nor FINRA nor any private 
individuals have pursued a Section 20(b) claim by itself, as a form of primary 
liability.  One may infer that the SEC has historically chosen other means to 
pursue violators of the federal securities laws  because of the “dearth” of reliable 
case law.  Without precedent, this understandably creates a serious litigation risk 
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that a case could be defeated on a technicality if the opposing party successfully 
argues that Section 20(b) only provides derivative liability.   
However, in considering the language of the legislative history, Section 
20(b) should be utilized to pursue violators who use dummies, dummy 
corporations or hide behind others to evade liability.  If the main purpose is to 
“catch the man who stands behind the scenes and controls the man who is in a 
nominal position of authority” then Section 20(b) provides a means of primary 
liability.320  One can imagine that this would be a desirable option for FINRA or 
the SEC in many different ways.  As an example, if the “controlled person” is 
unavailable or untouchable because of jurisdictional constraints, then Section 
20(b) would at least provide an opportunity to pursue the control person.  
Alternatively, if an investigation reveals that the controlled person will be a 
cooperative witness who agrees to testify against a controlling person, this may 
also merit the use of a Section 20(b) claim.  On the other hand, if a government 
agency that decided that it wanted to target both the controlling person and the 
controlled person under joint liability, it could pursue a Section 20(a) claim. 
Nevertheless, one potential roadblock in charging a Section 20(b) claim is 
the Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Stringer321decision.  As reviewed in Section III. B. IV, 
while Stringer acknowledged that Section 20(b) entitles claims based on unlawful 
activity through or by means of other persons, it also stated, without support, that 
“[b]oth Sections 20(a) and 20(b) create secondary liability.”322 Lumping Sections 
20(a) and Section 20(b) together, the court concluded, a second time that, “[b]oth 
sections impose secondary liability on persons who act by and through others.”323  
The problem is that these comments, which are arguably dicta, and if so, should 
be ignored as they do not have precedential value, do not cite to the legislative 
history or any cases whatsoever for support.  Consequently, it remains to be seen 
at a future date how Section 20(b) claims will be characterized.  Ideally, the 
Supreme Court will do the necessary legwork and research to reach the most 
reasonable conclusion that Section 20(b) claims may be pursued as a primary 
means of liability. 
Furthermore, in order to analyze a Section 20(b) claim according to its 
respective elements for proof, one can envision that the federal courts will 
                                                
320 78 CONG. REC. 8095. 
321 Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Stringer, No. Civ. 02-1341-ST, 2003 WL 23538011 at *1 (D. Or. Sept. 3, 
2003). 
322 Id. at *6.   
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eventually construct a three-part test, as follows, to require proof of a Section 
20(b) claim: 
• A controlling person or persons, whether acting as a dummy, dummy 
corporation, agent or real party in interest; 
• Who exercise(s) some form of actual or legally enforceable control over 
another who is a controlled person; and, 
• The commission of an unlawful act that violates the federal securities 
laws. 
Alternatively, to establish control, which will be fact intensive, one may 
set forth proof that there was some form of “realistic control” proposed by 
Kuehnle that is also consistent with 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b–2.  In terms of the 
contours of when the control may end, the legislative history makes it clear that a 
company that cedes control of a separate entity will not be subject to control 
person liability for violations that occur after the control ends.324 
Looking ahead, while there are many claims that could fall under the 
broad power envisioned by Section 20(b), which has been given new life by the 
expansion of penalties under the 1990 Remedies Act and other legislation enacted 
during the past twenty years, as well as the Janus decision, the SEC has already 
quietly contemplated Section 20(b) claims for other additional violations 
throughout the past fourteen (14) years, as we will see in the next sub-sections. 
1. Using Derivatives to Evade Rule 105 
As part of a proposed rule concerning short selling, the SEC makes it 
explicitly clear that using derivatives as a part of trading strategies designed to 
evade the application of Rule 105 does not comply with Commission rules.325  As 
an example, the Commission notes that some persons may attempt to skirt Rule 
105 by “claiming to have a position in a security by virtue of having entered into a 
‘married put’ transaction when in fact their transactions were the equivalent of 
short sales, for which they used shares acquired in the offering to close-out their 
restricted period sales.”326  Section 20(b) of the Exchange Act prohibits this type 
of conduct.  The Commission has also noted that: 
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purchases effected by prearrangement or other understanding 
through other purchasers in the primary offering are proscribed 
through the operation of Section 20(b) of the Exchange Act, 
which prohibits a person from doing indirectly any act that he is 
prohibited from doing directly by the Exchange Act or any rule 
thereunder.327 
During the rule comment period, the New York Stock Exchange wrote to 
advocate its support for the rule: 
Given the proliferation of this intentional manipulation of the 
market, the NYSE supports efforts by the industry to address the 
use of derivatives to disguise illegal covering activity.  The focus 
of these efforts should be to expose activities that intentionally 
circumvent the prohibitions of Rule 105 or otherwise manipulate 
the market around an offering of securities.  These efforts should, 
at a minimum, evaluate trading strategies using a sampling of 
different types of derivatives and assess the consequences of such 
conduct on the market, issuers and investors. Results from an 
industry effort to expose these strategies will allow the 
Commission and the securities industry, at large, to determine 
whether future rulemaking is necessary with respect to derivatives 
in this area.328 
Similar to the Imbruce decision, it is easy to envision that there will be 
future violations where options are used by controlling persons to engage in 
violations of Rule 105 that trigger Section 20(b) liability. 
2. Potential Violations of Regulation Fair Disclosure Triggering Section 
20(b) Claims 
Under Section 20(b) of the Exchange Act, a senior manager who directs 
another person to make the disclosure may be held liable for a claim under 
Section 20(b) and Regulation Fair Disclosure (which is treated as 13(a) claim).  
Under the Final Rule on selective disclosure and insider trading, the SEC 
established that “neither an issuer nor such a covered person could avoid the 
reach of the regulation merely by having a non-covered person make a selective 
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disclosure.”329 Therefore, Section 20(b) prohibits a senior official from escaping 
liability “by directing non-covered personnel to make a selective disclosure of 
information to someone within the classes of enumerated recipients.  In such a 
case, the senior officer would be held responsible for making the selective 
disclosure.”330  In essence, the senior manager would be viewed as the controlling 
person and the “other” employee as the one who is controlled.  Finally, the 
definition of a “person acting on behalf of the issuer” specifically excludes an 
“officer, director, employee, or agent of an issuer who discloses material 
nonpublic information in breach of a duty of trust or confidence to an issuer.”331  
Accordingly, “[i]n this situation, the issuer would not be held responsible under 
Regulation FD for its employee's actions.”332   
3. Falsification of Accounting Records May Trigger Section 20(b) Violations 
Pursuant to 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-1, which concerns the falsification of 
accounting records: “No person shall directly or indirectly, falsify or cause to be 
falsified, any book, record or account subject to section 13(b)(2)(A) of the 
Securities Exchange Act.”  By including the term “indirectly” the statute, as 
codified, includes a reference to multiple other provisions of the federal securities 
laws, including Section 20(b).333  As a result, this provides another means to 
establish liability for Section 20(b) claims. 
4. Regulation AC May Present Opportunities for Section 20(b) Claims 
In 2003, the SEC issued the final rule on Regulation AC, which requires: 
that brokers, dealers, and certain persons associated with a broker 
or dealer include in research reports certifications by the research 
analyst that the views expressed in the report accurately reflect his 
or her personal views, and disclose whether or not the analyst 
received compensation or other payments in connection with his 
or her specific recommendations or views.334 
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In a footnote in the release, it explains that “Regulation AC is directed at 
those regulated persons that prepare research reports, as well as persons 
associated with regulated persons who might be used if attempts were made to 
improperly circumvent the rule.”335  Also, this statement refers to Section 20(b) in 
anticipation of such claims based on Regulation AC violations. 
CONCLUSION 
Similar to many of the other provisions of the ’34 Act, Section 20(b) was 
created to address unlawful activity affecting the markets.  It provides a specific 
means for government agencies to “catch the man behind the man” to prevent 
violators from evading liability.  Also, the legislative history supports a broad, 
rather than narrow, purpose behind the law as a means of primary liability.  This 
article is intended to frame the discussion so that the federal courts will treat 
Section 20(b) claims distinctly from Section 20(a) claims and to properly evaluate 
Section 20(b) claims on their own right and in their own context.  With 
restrictions on insider trading as a result of the Janus decision, government 
agencies should consider utilizing and implementing Section 20(b) to obtain relief.  
If doing so ultimately protects investors, then this also supports one aspect of the 
SEC’s tri-partite mission.  By extension, if prevailing on such claims results in 
relief for the government and possibly the investing public, this should also deter 
future violations of the federal securities laws. 
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